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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Lee Odell Fair appeals from the judgment of conviction on a jury's verdict 
of guilt for aggravated battery and being a persistent violator. Fair contends the 
trial court erred in excluding evidence of an alternate perpetrator. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
A jury found Lee Odell Fair guilty of aggravated battery and being a 
persistent violator. (R., pp. 198, 201; PSI, pp. 2-3.) The charges arose from a 
fight outside Dino's Bar. (PSI, pp. 2-3.) The victim is Gerry Blakely. (PSI, pp. 2-
3.) 
Blakely had gone to Dino's Bar with Joel Hoffman, Shelley Thompson, 
and Laura Suydam, to hear a band. (Trial Tr., p. 162, L. 21 - p. 163, L. 14.) 
Hoffman decided to play pool and was approached by Fair and an unidentified 
man to play for money. (Trial Tr., p. 164, L. 25 - p. 165, L. 8; p. 167, Ls. 5-7; p. 
168, Ls. 12-14.) During the game, Hoffman and the man disagreed on the rules; 
Hoffman called the man a name which made him angry. (Trial Tr., p. 169, Ls. 1-
10; p. 170, L. 19 - p. 171, L. 24.) Hoffman lost, paid the man, then rejoined 
Blakely and the others. (Trial Tr., p. 172, Ls. 8-16.} 
After a while, Blakely, Hoffman, Thompson and Suydam left the bar. 
(Trial Tr., p. 172, Ls. 19-25.) In the parking lot, Fair and the unidentified man 
confronted Hoffman. (Trial Tr., p. 173, Ls. 3-11.) Hoffman and Blakely tried 
unsuccessfully to diffuse the situation. (Trial Tr., p. 129, L. 14; p. 173, Ls. 12-
16.) The unidentified man and Hoffman scuffled. (Trial Tr., p. 175, Ls. 3-14.) 
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Blakely started to walk away, but was punched in the face, ripping his lip open 
and necessitating jaw surgery. (Trial Tr., p.131, Ls. 7-18; p.133, Ls. 5-9; p. 134, 
Ls. 3-8; p. 136, Ls. 1-5.) Blakely and Thompson testified that Fair had delivered 
the punch. (Trial Tr., p. 131, L. 23- p. 132, L. 9; p. 148, Ls. 3-11; p. 150, Ls. 
12-17.) 
The defense sought to present evidence that Richard Laine had 
confessed to the assault on Blakely. (R., pp. 159-64.) The state objected to 
admission of this evidence, asserting in part that two eyewitnesses identified Fair 
as the attacker, and no evidence put Laine at the scene of the crime. (R., pp. 
134-35, 140-42.) In support, the defense made offers of proof through several 
witnesses, outside the jury's presence. (Trial Tr., p. 211, L. 25 - p. 258, L. 6.) 
The trial court determined that none of the witnesses presented relevant 
testimony warranting presentation of evidence to advance Fair's alternate 
perpetrator theory. (Trial Tr., p. 217, L. 21 - p. 219, L. 24; p. 224, L. 16 - p. 226, 
L. 15; p. 231, L. 15 - p. 233, L. 20; p. 240, L. 6 - p. 241, L. 3; p. 250, L. 9 - p. 
251, L. 18; p. 257, L. 6 -p. 258, L. 6.) 
Upon the jury's guilty verdict, the court entered judgment and sentenced 
Fair to a term of five years fixed and 15 indeterminate. (R., pp. 203-04.) Fair 
timely appealed. (R., pp. 207-09.) 
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ISSUES 
Fair states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it excluded relevant, admissible 
evidence that Richie Laine may have actually committee the 
aggravated battery against Gerry Blakely, because the evidence 
was admissible hearsay tending to make it less probable that Fair 
committed the crime? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 7.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Fair failed to show the trial court erred or abused its discretion in excluding 
evidence of an alternate perpetrator because Fair's offers of proof lacked the 
requisite relevance and indicia of trustworthiness? 
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ARGUMENT 
Fair Has Failed To Show The Trial Court Erred Or Abused Its Discretion In 
Excluding Evidence Of An Alternate Perpetrator Because Fair's Offers Of Proof 
Lacked The Requisite Relevance And lndicia Of Trustworthiness 
A Introduction 
According to Fair, the trial court erred in excluding evidence that Richard 
Laine - not Fair - committed the battery upon Gerry Blakely. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 7-14.) Fair cannot meet his burden of showing error or abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law that the appellate court 
reviews freely. State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 238-39, 220 P.3d 1055, 1057-58 
(Ct. App. 2009). However, the trial court has broad discretion in admitting 
evidence, and its judgment will be reversed only on finding it clearly abused that 
discretion. State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 521, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003). The 
appellate court thus conducts a two-part inquiry: it first freely reviews the 
question whether the proffered evidence is relevant; it then determines if the trial 
court abused its discretion in finding that unfair prejudice outweighed the 
evidence's probative value. Meister, 148 Idaho at 239,220 P.3d at 1058. 
C. To Be Admissible As Relevant, Evidence Must Satisfy Rules Regarding 
Hearsay 
The Idaho Rules of Evidence govern whether alleged confessions by an 
alternate perpetrator are admissible at trial. Meister, 148 Idaho at 241, 220 P.3d 
at 1060. Evidence may be excluded, even if relevant, "if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
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issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." I.RE. 403. Applying 
this rule to an alleged alternate perpetrator's confessions, such confessions must 
satisfy the evidentiary rules' standards regarding hearsay. Meister, 148 Idaho at 
241, 220 P.3d at 1060. 
D. Under Hearsay Rules, Evidence Of An Alternate Perpetrator's Confession 
Must Satisfy Considerations Of Reliability And Corroboration 
Hearsay is a statement made by one other than the declarant testifying at 
trial, and offered "to prove the truth of the matter asserted." I.RE. 801(c). 
Confessions of an alternative perpetrator constitute hearsay. See Meister, 148 
Idaho at 239, 220 P.3d at 1058. Hearsay is not admissible unless an exception 
applies. I.RE. 802. 
A statement may be admissible as non-hearsay where the declarant is 
unavailable and the statement is so contrary to the declarant's interest that "a 
reasonable man in declarant's position would not have made the statement 
unless declarant believed it to be true." I.RE. 804(b)(3). To be admitted as non-
hearsay, such statement "tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and 
offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating 
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement." I.RE. 
804(b)(3). Under this rule, the court in Meister adopted a seven-factor test, for 
determining whether an alleged alternate perpetrator's confession is sufficiently 
reliable and corroborative: 
Those factors are: (1) whether the declarant is unavailable; (2) 
whether the statement is against the declarant's interest; (3) 
whether corroborating circumstances exist which clearly indicate 
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the trustworthiness of the exculpatory statement, taking into 
account contradictory evidence, the relationship between the 
declarant and the listener, and the relationship between the 
declarant and the defendant; (4) whether the declarant has issued 
the statement multiple times; (5) whether a significant amount of 
time has passed between the incident and the statement; (6) 
whether the declarant will benefit from making the statement; and 
(7) whether the psychological and physical surroundings could 
affect the statement. 
Meister, 148 Idaho at 242, 220 P.3d at 1061 n. 7 (citing State v. LaGrand, 153 
Ariz. 21, 27-28, 734 P.2d 563, 569-70 (1987)). Under these considerations, 
argued as follows, the proffered evidence did not sufficiently corroborate the 
trustworthiness of Laine's alleged confessions. Further, the evidence failed to 
reliably establish that Laine's statements were even a confession to Fair's crime, 
as opposed to a different attack. The evidence was thus appropriately excluded. 
E. The Trial Court Properly Excluded Laine's Alleged Confessions. As There 
Was Insufficient Corroborating Evidence For A Reasonable Person To 
Believe The Hearsay Statements Were Trustworthy, Or That The 
Statements Actually Constituted Confessions To Fair's Crime 
The defense made offers of proof through six witnesses, to support its 
argument that Laine, rather than Fair, perpetrated the crime against Blakely. 
(Trial Tr., p. 213, L. 19 - p. 258, L. 6.) After each witness, the trial court 
determined that there was inadequate corroborating evidence to establish the 
relevance or trustworthiness of Laine's alleged confessions. (See Trial Tr., p. 
217, L. 21 - p. 219, L. 24; p. 224, L. 16-p. 226, L. 15; p. 231, L. 15- p. 233, L. 
20; p. 240, L. 6 - p. 241, L. 3; p. 250, L. 9 - p. 251, L. 18; p. 257, L. 6 - p. 258, 
L. 6.) 
The defense first questioned Richard Laine. Laine denied being at Dino's 
at the time of the incident, and denied telling a defense investigator that he hit 
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Gerry Blakely. (Trial Tr., p. 214, Ls. 13 - p. 215, L. 3.) Laine denied discussing 
with Nina Lucas, Leonard Rood, or Larson Firth, an incident at Dino's in which he 
broke a gentleman's jaw. (Trial Tr., p. 215, L. 13 - p. 216, L. 18.) Laine also 
denied telling Fair that he would not confess about the incident. (Trial Tr., p. 
216, L. 25 - p. 217, L. 3.) Although Laine's testimony established his 
"unavailability," it did not satisfy any other reliability factors listed in Meister. The 
trial court properly found no useful purpose in calling Laine to testify before the 
jury. (Trial Tr., p. 218, Ls. 2-12.) 
The defense next called Larson Firth. According to Firth, Laine told her 
"there was a fight that happened at [Dino's] and that some guys were going to 
jump [Fair] ... and [Laine} ended up knocking the guy out .... " (Trial Tr., p. 221, 
Ls. 7-9; p. 223, Ls. 22-25.) Laine allegedly told Firth he knocked a guy out to 
defend Fair; thus the statement was not against his interest, and did not tend to 
expose him to criminal liability. The trial court also noted Firth's testimony did 
not establish that Laine confessed multiple times, nor did it clearly indicate Laine 
had struck Blakely rather than Hoffman. (Trial Tr., p. 224, L. 16 - p. 226, L. 15.) 
Firth's testimony about Laine's alleged confession was unreliable under Meister 
factors three, four, six, and seven. Thus, the trial court appropriately excluded 
testimony by Firth about Laine's alleged confessions. 
The defense called Nina Ann Lucas. Lucas described a conversation in 
which Laine told her he "cold-cocked some guy" at Dino's Bar. (Trial Tr., p. 227, 
L. 19 - p. 228, L. 2.) As with Firth, the trial court noted that Lucas offered mere 
speculation that Laine's statement referred to Blakely, as opposed to Hoffman. 
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(Trial Tr., p. 232, Ls. 5-15.) Also, given that the Laine's statements were made 
to friends "quite willing to shield him," they failed to implicate a penal interest. 
(Trial Tr., p. 233, Ls. 7-13.) Lucas's testimony about Laine's alleged confession 
was unreliable under Meister factors two, three, six, and seven. The trial court 
thus properly excluded testimony by Lucas. 
Next, the defense called Leonard Rood. Rood testified that he was 
engaged in a drug deal with Laine and Laine's friend Lee; according to Rood, 
Lee said Laine had punched a guy at Dino's bar, and Laine did not deny it. (Trial 
Tr., p. 235, Ls. 4-7; p. 236, Ls. 3-20.) Notably the declarant was Lee, not Laine. 
Given the circumstances, there was no reason for Laine to deny the statement 
out of penal interest. This offer of proof failed to satisfy any of the reliability 
factors under Meister. The trial court correctly determined that Rood's testimony 
would not assist the state or defense in reaching the truth of the situation, and 
thus excluded it. (Trial Tr., p. 240, Ls. 16-22.) 
The defense then called Norman Ortiz-Perez. Ortiz-Perez testified that, 
while in jail, he overheard a conversation between Laine and Fair; Fair told 
Laine, "you know how much time I'm facing for this?" and Laine responded that 
he was sorry but "I ain't going to tell on myself, but ... [i]f I get to bond out, I'm 
going to try to find somebody to come and go to court and say I did it." (Trial Tr., 
p. 249, Ls. 8-22.) The trial court described the exchange as "a somewhat 
concerted effort to present a confused version." (Trial Tr., p. 250, Ls. 17-18.) 
The trial court correctly found no statement against interest, and no corroborating 
circumstances indicating trustworthiness. (Trial Tr., p. 250, Ls. 9-16.) Again, the 
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trial court noted that the statements could refer to Hoffman or Blakely, thus the 
most basic requirements for an alternate perpetrator were not satisfied. (Trial 
Tr., p. 250, L. 20 - p. 251, L. 4.) Ortiz-Perez's testimony about an alleged 
confession by Laine was unreliable under Meister factors two, three, and seven,. 
Finally, the defense called Tommy Basco. Basco testified he was with 
Fair when Fair received a phone call from a person Basco believed was a 
detective; Basco overheard the caller say, "I don't think you are the one who did 
it, but I know you know who did, and if you don't tell me, then I'm going after 
you." (Trial Tr., p. 255, L. 4 - p. 256, L. 2.) This offer of proof bore no relation to 
Laine and thus did not satisfy any of the reliability factors in Meister. The trial 
court cited Rule 804(b)(3), and found that Basco had no relevant information to 
offer, and that no testimony of any witness in the defense's offer of proof 
satisfies the rule's requirements. (Trial Tr., p. 257, L. 6 - p. 258, L. 6.) 
Fair has identified no factual or legal basis to find the trial court erred or 
abused its discretion in excluding the witnesses' testimonies. Critically - without 
even addressing the Meister factors - the proffered evidence lacks probative 
value that would outweigh the danger of misleading the jury because it is unclear 
that the alleged confessions pertain to Fair's crime. See I.RE. 403. Under the 
Meister factors, Laine's offers of proof lacked reliability or corroborative value. 
Fair asserts that the proffered evidence "tended to make it less probable 
that Fair committed the crime, because it tended to make it more probable that 
Richie Laine was the actual perpetrator." (Appellant's brief, p. 9.) But this 
assertion offers a conclusion without any support; simply arguing that testimony 
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is relevant does not make it so. Fair dismisses the trial court's concern that 
Laine's alleged confessions never clearly identify the victim, and are not made to 
anyone who might implicate Laine's penal interest. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14.) 
Without these key elements present, the proposed testimonies are irrelevant 
and, as the trial court warned, "untrustworthy statements ... shielding [the 
declarant] from meaningful cross-examination." (Trial Tr., p. 232, Ls. 5-8.) Fair 
contends that "each of the statements could corroborate each other." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 13.) But the evidence does not gain relevance through 
sheer volume where none of the statements is a clear confession to Fair's crime. 
Because Fair fails to show that the proffered evidence was relevant or 
trustworthy, he cannot establish that the district court abused its broad discretion 
in excluding it. Perry. 139 Idaho at 521, 81 P.3d at 1231. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that the Court affirm the judgment of 
conviction. 
DATED this 8th day of July, 2013. 
D~G~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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